Abstract. We examine the proposition that incentives for legislative organization can be explained by the nature of electoral competition. We argue that legislators in environments where parties are competitive for majority status are most likely to have delegated power to their leadership to constrain individualistic behavior within their party, which will in turn increase the spatial predictability of individual voting patterns. Using roll call votes and district-level electoral data from the U.S. state legislatures, we show empirically that increased statewide interparty competition corresponds to much more predictable voting behavior overall, while legislators from competitive districts have less predictable behavior.
Introduction
Recent work on parties in legislatures, especially that drawing on Cox & McCubbins (1993) , has suggested that parties' incentives to organize legislatures are in large part a function of a collective electoral strategy. According to this view, parties should organize for the collective goal of protecting and developing a party reputation. Party reputations indeed can provide a valuable basis for voters to make choices (Rahn 1993 , Schaffner & Streb 2002 , Woon & Pope 2008 , but for a party to contest elections as a group it must develop a coherent record of behavior (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991 , Smith 2000 that simplifies electoral choices. This means organizing a legislative party such that individual actions to win support from local constituencies and interest groups do not undermine the party record. At the same time, many legislators, especially those from competitive districts, rely substantially on their personal reputations to win elections (Mayhew 1974) and therefore must respond to unique district interests in order to strengthen their own chances of reelection (Canes-Wrone, Brady & Cogan 2002) . To limit the potential for these incentives to undermine party goals, Cox & McCubbins (1993) emphasize the importance of delegating power to allow leaders to manage their organizations.
Extending this literature, we suggest that the extent to which parties should play the role of shaping a coherent electoral choice will depend upon the nature of party competition for majority status. Specifically, the incentives for parties to develop clearer collective reputations should be strongest in chambers where the majority and minority parties are in close competition, even when this may be individually costly for legislators from competitive districts. In such situations, where majority control can easily change hands, party members have far more to gain from delegating to their party leadership the power to create and protect a party record. As a result, while individual legislators from competitive electoral districts should have the most idiosyncratic behavior within their parties, parties as a whole should be more likely to reduce these tendencies when facing more competitive electoral environments at the party level.
The cross-sectional variation in party systems and legislative behavior in the U.S. state assemblies provides a useful venue with which to evaluate the foundations of legislative organization theory (Aldrich & Battista 2002 , Squire & Hamm 2005 , Battista & Richman 2011 . We build on the previous literature on legislative parties to understand the circumstances under which conflicting incentives between party and individual goals can be reconciled. To examine the empirical implications of this question, we use individual-level cross-sectional data on roll call voting and elections in the U.S. state assemblies from 1999 to 2000. We focus on deviations from "unidimensional" (spatial) behavior, as captured by the individual "error" rates generated by roll call predictions from the W-NOMINATE spatial voting model. We use these error rates to capture the degree to which each member's voting responds to non-ideological or "multi-dimensional" pressures, which result in voting that is poorly predicted by a spatial model. With this data, we examine how party competition, along with individual district circumstances, explains the coherence of legislative behavior.
We find that, overall, members in competitive districts indeed tend to have less predictable legislative voting within their parties. However, among parties as groups, we find that there is a consistent relationship between the competitiveness of majority status in the party system and the degree to which party members display predictable voting behavior. We also find that majority party members tend to have more coherent voting behavior on average. We interpret these results to suggest that while parties generally tend to be more coherent in competitive systems, majority parties may be consistently better able to exploit chamber control to structure the voting patterns of their members.
Party versus Individual Electoral Incentives
Much literature on Congress suggests that a key motivation for parties to actively organize in legislatures stems from the electoral strategy to cultivate a party reputation (Cox & McCubbins 1993 , Hager & Talbert 2000 , Sinclair 1995 , Snyder & Ting 2002 , Woon & Pope 2008 . This literature suggests that one of the most important ways parties cultivate a reputation is by creating a coherent party voting record. These records of behavior establish "greater consistency in positions across issues" (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991, 40) and increase the informational value of the party label. A strong party reputation signals the policies a political party would pursue and enables the electorate to hold parties accountable for policy, enabling a "responsible" party system (American Political Science Association 1950).
Individual Strategy and Party Response. Despite possible collective benefits noted in the above literature, individual members may have an incentive to avoid allowing their behavior to be constrained. Legislators elected from individual districts generally have incentives to improve their own chance of reelection (Mayhew 1974 , Berry, Berkman & Schneiderman 2000 . Often this means behaving in alignment with constituents' policy preferences (Canes-Wrone, Brady & Cogan 2002 , Carson et al. 2010 and building an electoral coalition in one's district (Ansolabehere, Snyder & Stewart 2001 , Snyder & Ting 2003 .
1 This might mean voting in line with regional economic concerns or other local interests, which will shift depending on how these constituents are affected by an issue and with the salience of the issue (Bishin 2009 ).
This behavior is distinct from party members' responses to their district's ideological policy preferences. Rather, the behavior of interest here reflects an issue-by-issue consideration of district interests in a way that does not conform to spatial classification (i.e., non-ideological behavior). Building a favorable personal reputation in the district separate from ideology means responding to pivotal interest groups who "press upon the candidate some special claim" (Schlesinger 1991, 136) . In the aggregate, and in the absence of party constraints, this means independent legislators will join shifting coalitions in the chamber as is necessary to cater to various constituencies in the district. This may entail voting more with ad hoc coalitions or a tendency to trade votes on policy for narrow distributive benefits (Evans 1994 , Evans 2004 . For this reason, we would expect to observe highly complex voting environments in the absence of parties (Jenkins 1999 , Wright & Schaffner 2002 .
Given these demands, legislators have good reason not to support empowering parties with the authority to restrict their choices. Legislators should prefer minimal constraints on their voting behavior. Even if party goals are valuable, these goals are public goods lacking incentives for spontaneous cooperation. However, parties can limit the incentives and opportunities of members to participate in ad hoc voting coalitions that would harm the party record. At least for those facing the fewest pressures to join shifting coalitions in the chamber-those in electorally "safer" districts-incentives such as committee assignments or other resources can balance potential electoral costs from party-constrained behavior (Cox & 1 Individual voting records may play a smaller direct role in state elections than Congress, due to a lower information environment (Hogan 2008) , which may make party organization generally less costly to develop overall. Nevertheless, voting behavior still remains as one of the few tools with which these legislators can directly establish a reputation among their constituents.
McCubbins 2005, Kanthak 2009 , Carroll & Kim 2010 . Even in the context of well-organized parties, legislators facing incentives to join shifting coalitions should display more complex voting behavior. Put differently, a party organization need not achieve strict party unity in order to avoid widespread opportunistic behavior, but should constrain primarily those members with the least electoral "need" for an independent reputation. Such environments should be relatively more unidimensional.
Collective Strategy and Party Reputation. Even if parties can empower their leadership to constrain the choices of members, as this literature suggests, they do not necessarily have an incentive to do so. While Cox & McCubbins (1993) argue that parties should actively prevent behavior that undermines the party label, this argument follows from the assumption that the party label is consistently valuable for pursuing party goals, majority status being chief among them. A party record can be valuable as a means to communicate to voters the types of policies that will emerge if the party were to win control of the legislative process. However, the party label is valuable to members only insofar as chamber majority status is indeed an immediate collective goal and the party organization is a viable means to achieve it. Given the individual costs described above, the value of using legislative organization to achieve partisan goals depends on the likelihood that such collective gains can in fact be reaped. This in turn depends on the extent to which control of the chamber is likely to change hands. It is in these competitive environments that collective competition between the parties should be most salient and the reputation of the party as a whole would be more likely to mean the difference between winning or losing control of the chamber.
In chambers with a dominant majority party, the expected value of protecting or obtaining majority status is much less likely to outweigh members' costs in organizing the party, given that it would have little effect on the party's collective fortunes. The opposite can be said for highly competitive party environments where change in majority status is a strong possibility. When political parties are in close competition for majority control of the chamber and small party vote swings can sway majority status, members will most clearly benefit from leaders with the power to strengthen their collective reputation.
While all members of all parties should have these incentives, a party holding a majority of seats is better positioned in a given session to exploit many of the tools highlighted in the Congressional literature, such as agenda control (Cox & McCubbins 1993 , Cox & McCubbins 2005 , bundling legislation (Sinclair 2002 ) and more valuable selective incentives (Cox & McCubbins 1993 , Maltzman 1998 , Cox & Magar 1999 , Lawrence, Maltzman & Smith 2006 . Thus, to the extent the majority party has greater access to the types of tools that can be used to constrain behavior, we would see more coherent behavior from majority party members than those in the minority party. Note that we also find empirical evidence in the U.S. state legislatures that majority party leadership is consistently perceived to have greater influence on legislative behavior than minority party leadership. Using legislator responses from the 1995 State Legislative Survey (Carey, Niemi & Powell 1995) , we examine two chamber-level measurements of majority party leadership power and of minority party leadership power for all states. One measurement uses only survey responses from members of the majority party or minority party to create an average chamber-level index (on a one to seven scale) of the extent of majority party and minority party influence on legislative behavior, respectively. The second measurement uses survey responses from all legislators. A difference-of-means test shows that the majority party leadership is consistently perceived to have more influence than that of the minority party, significant for both measures at the .01 level. In summary, while the incentives to constrain behavior should not differ between parties, we do see this pattern as consistent with the notion that majority parties are generally better positioned to do so.
Evidence of a broad relationship between parties and legislative organization has been noted in the literature on Congress and the state legislatures. Jenkins (1999) compares the dimensionality of the behavior in the 19 th Century U.S. and Confederate Houses to show that the existence of parties structures votes in such a way that legislators in the former chamber have more coherent behavior.
3 Similarly, the non-partisan Nebraska chamber lacks structured voting behavior (Wright & Schaffner 2002) , as do chambers like the dominantparty Rhode Island house (Wright & Osborn 2002) . Taken together, these findings suggest that parties are likely a necessary condition for imposing structure on legislative behavior. If the collective reputational motivations noted in the Congressional literature can be generalized to vary with the value of majority status, as we argue above, we expect that the basic structuring influence of parties varies depending on the incentives to exploit competitive environments. Specifically, our aim here is to evaluate how the tendency for legislators to have unpredictable patterns depends on the continuous variation in parties' organizational emphasis on the goal of majority status, despite the individual electoral motivations of legislators that can run counter to that collective goal.
With regard to the related issue of formal chamber rules, majority parties across state assemblies certainly vary in the types of gate-keeping tools that can be used to control the legislative process (Clucas 2001) . Over time, these formal rules may be endogenous to the party organizational incentives of majorities. For instance, Clucas (2001) finds that speakers with stronger formal powers in U.S. state lower chambers tend to correspond to more competitive states. Since we focus on the behavioral organization of legislatures, subject to informal factors, we do not argue that formal chamber powers are a necessary condition for empowering party leadership. Rather, we argue that member behavior reflects the degree of authority delegated to the party leadership to use any formal powers that are available as well as to "exercise powers that are not actually given [to] them in the formal rules" (Clucas 2001, 324) . In practice, the de facto power of party leaders will be largely a function of delegation through informal channels, which may or may not be supplemented by chamber rules (Battista 2011) . We consider these as alternate mechanisms by which comparable behavioral goals can be achieved in different settings. Furthermore, party leaders' de facto power may even extend beyond the legislature itself. If the political environment is sufficiently institutionalized, we would expect that the preferences of members can be shaped even before the election by leadership involvement in the candidate recruitment process, minimizing the need for legislative mechanisms. Indeed, consistent with this argument, increased interparty competition has been shown to correlate with party leaders in state assemblies being more active in recruiting candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2006) .
In sum, legislative parties can exploit a variety of different tools-formal, informal, and extra-legislative-to aid the leadership in maintaining the coherence of their legislative parties. Observed behavior may reflect the cumulative effects of using these organizational tools, but will ultimately depend on the incentives to use them. Individually, there is some evidence that these mechanisms are related in various ways to interparty competition, or, as we interpret it, the prospects of winning and losing majority status.
Implications for the Structure of Legislative Voting. We assess the effects of party organization using legislative voting behavior as a reflection of the influence of all forms of legislative partisan organization. For these purposes, we focus on the degree of "predictability" in voting behavior focused at the individual legislator level. In structured voting environments, where an underlying dynamic of conflict defines all votes, individual voting behavior can be predicted by a single dimension of variance. These "low-dimensional" legislative environments contain seemingly unrelated votes on issues that are connected by a basic underlying dimension, such as "liberal-conservative" or another ideological conflict. Votes are "predictable" when an individual's behavior on specific votes can be inferred from their position within this underlying dimension. By contrast, unstructured legislative environments, consisting of spontaneous short-term interactions, are characterized by uncertainty and complex coalitions. Because these votes are disconnected, this results in a less predictable multi-dimensional voting pattern. While ideological cues provide some simplification to a repeated voting environment when legislators vote sincerely on policy and are fully informed of policy consequences (Poole 2005) , party organizations are widely believed to substantially institutionalize the simplification of legislative choices (Aldrich 1995 , Sinclair 2002 . With parties to simplify the individual choices of legislators, the complexity of a legislative choice environment diminishes dramatically (Jenkins 1999 , Wright & Schaffner 2002 .
While almost all legislatures have parties that introduce some structure to behavior, the degree of partisan involvement in the organization should relate to overall patterns of predictability in voting. Together, the arguments above imply that parties in legislatures with the greatest incentives to organize voting (competitive party systems) should correspond to members whose individual voting records are more predictable than those where those incentives are weakest (uncompetitive party systems), while the most predictable voters within these parties should be those with the safest districts.
Data and Measurements
We test our argument using legislative voting behavior along with individual and party electoral outcomes in combination with chamber characteristics in the U.S. upper and lower state chambers during the 1999-2000 legislative sessions. Testing this theory in U.S. states using cross-sectional data provides a political environment with wide variation in individual and party electoral competition across states and within states. Because states and state chambers have unique group-level effects on legislative and voting behavior (i.e., legislator observations in each state and chamber are interdependent within state and state chamber clusters), we employ a multi-level linear regression with random intercepts to account for unmeasured variation in both the underlying state and chamber-level effects.
4
Unpredictable Behavior. We argue that the effects of parties constraining choices can be observed as low dimensional voting behavior-that is, easily predicted by a spatial voting model. With this we aim to measure the consistency of voting-the extent to which "frequent and dramatic changes in voting behavior undermine the value of the party label" (Kiewiet & McCubbins 1991, 43) . We can measure this for each legislator from the one-dimensional W-NOMINATE spatial model of voting using the model's correct classification rate. The classification rate reflects the degree to which a one-dimensional spatial model can correctly classify actual voting behavior (Poole & Rosenthal 1997 , Poole et al. 2011 . A low dimensional voting environment indicates that legislators are voting consistently with those who 4 In the appendix we also include a series of models with additional control variables are estimated as spatially proximate.
5 Related aggregate fit statistics for roll calls are often used at the chamber level to assess the overall dimensionality of voting (Jenkins 1999 , Wright & Schaffner 2002 .
By contrast to most previous work, we measure this concept of predictable voting at the individual level. For individual legislators, the classification rate is larger for members whose behavior is well explained by the first dimension of the roll call data-those making the fewest "errors" from the perspective of a one-dimensional spatial model. "Error" here refers to instances when individual legislator votes (yea or nay) are not accurately predicted by the spatial model (i.e., the vote prediction is located on the opposite side of the cutting point than the observed position). The classification rate for each individual legislator is derived from the individual vote errors to determine how accurately the W-NOMINATE scaling procedure can predict a legislator's overall voting behavior along a single dimension (Poole & Rosenthal 1997) .
6 A high classification rate means that the member's voting coalitions can be consistently predicted in a one-dimensional space. A low classification rate means that one-dimensional measures of a member's spatial location cannot routinely predict which voting coalitions she would join. Behavior is "idiosyncratic" or "unpredictable" in the sense that there are a large variety of potential voting coalitions that a legislator is likely to join, rather than a systematic pattern. We use Wright's (2004) Returns, 1967 Returns, -2003 . For most legislative districts, this is a simple calculation that is the percent of total votes that separates the winner from the runner-up (i.e., the margin of victory) in plurality single-member districts.
8
Because we are concerned about the threats to losing a seat in the election, we use the natural log of each candidate's percent margin of victory. The log transformation captures the intuition that increasing the margin of victory between the winner and the runner-up has a diminishing effect on the degree to which that seat is "safe." That is, the change in the threat to losing a seat between one percent and ten percent margin of victory is more important, in terms of influencing a legislator's voting behavior, than further increases in an already large margin.
5 Note that even a party with many "moderate" or "disloyal" members can be still retain low dimensional and coherent ideological structure to voting. Classification error reflects the consistency of members voting within a coalition across votes. 6 The classification rate is simply a function of the proportion of correctly predicted votes, determined using the following formula for each legislator:
CorrectlyP redictedV otes T otalV otes × 100. "Error" in this context should be distinguished from the degree of statistical error in the estimation itself (Carroll et al. 2009 ). This calculation is more complicated in multi-member districts and in districts where there is cross-listing. For each winner we calculate the percent difference from the first loser. In these districts, the first loser is the candidate that has the most votes among those who do not win a seat. The intuition here is that candidates are competing to win enough votes to earn a seat, rather than competing to win the most votes possible. Thus, legislators, in terms of their voting behavior, are responding to their risk of not winning a seat. Where cross-listing is possible, we aggregate total votes earned by each candidate across party affiliation and determine the percent vote difference between the winner(s) and the runner-up (or, first loser). New York is the only state in our sample that allows cross-listing. In the appendix, we examine this case and find that this captures additional variation in partisan dependence that is consistent with our argument here.
Party competition is also calculated based on the Carsey et al. (2007) state elections data. This is determined by aggregating the number of votes for each candidate affiliated with the party for each chamber election. Cross-listed candidates have their votes distributed across each party based upon how many votes they won affiliated with that party. Party competition is the absolute percent difference between the two major parties in the chamber (i.e., Democrats and Republicans). Smaller differences indicate that the parties are highly competitive in terms of their ability to gain or lose majority status in the chamber. Individual party votes are aggregated to demonstrate how (un)successful the party is overall in the election. Again we use the log transformation of the percent difference to capture the diminishing threat of losing the majority (or likelihood of winning the majority) as the party wins more votes in the aggregate.
9 Majority party status and membership is determined using Klarner's (2003) State Legislative Partisanship data.
Since this variable should capture the overall degree of competition in a district, we take into account information from more than just the previous election. To do so, we use an average of all elections for the past decade weighted by an exponential decay function for our measure of individual (district) and party (aggregate) electoral competition. As a result, the contemporaneous elections are weighted most, since we expect that the most recent election would be more salient to individuals and parties in considering their strategy. The weight is zero beyond the tenth year. Elections with two-year cycles use six total elections to calculate the measure; elections with four-year cycles use three total election to calculate the measure.
10 We use the same approach for both individual and party electoral competition. This approach moderates the effect that unusual elections have on the measure.
11 We refer to these measures below as Weighted District Margin and Weighted Party Vote Difference. The empirical model includes the direct effect for each of the above independent variables (majority party status, district margin, and party vote difference). We expect to observe
9
We focus on electoral competition (aggregate votes) here because we consider it more direct in capturing the quantity of interest (the overall balance in support for the two parties). Although electoral competition and majority size are similar in practice, they do capture two distinct concepts (see Barrilleaux, Holbrook & Langer (2002) . Where they differ due to the translation of votes to seats, we suggest that vote differences best capture the perception of party competition. However, we also evaluated our models below replacing aggregate party electoral competition with partisan composition in the chamber and find similar results.
10
Seven state upper chambers have a 4-4-2 (or, some combination) election cycle, including: Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Texas. These states use four election cycles to derive the measure. Weights are determined using the number of years from the election immediately preceding the legislative session of interest, which is generally the 1998 election (i.e., the 'Roll Call' election). In a four-year cycle, the election directly preceding the 'Roll Call' election has the same weight as the second election in a two-year cycle that precedes the 'Roll Call' election. Weights are normalized between 0 and 1 to account for the disparity in the number of weights across different election cycles.
11
Using only the contemporaneous competition measurement (i.e., the 'Roll Call' election) produces similar results to those below.
12
Legislators with two-year terms are elected in the election cycle directly preceding the 1999-2000 session. Legislators with four-year terms are elected in the election two cycles prior. relatively more predictable behavior (i.e., more one-dimensional behavior) for "safe" legislators in either party and overall for legislators in the majority party. Specifically, we expect a result in which the district margin is positive and significant and party vote difference is negative and significant and majority party members should generally have lower dimensional behavior. Our unit of analysis is the individual legislator. Descriptive plots of the distribution of the dependent variable-classification rate-separated by state and chamber are presented in the appendix (see Figure 4) . Because there is unmeasured variation affecting all legislator observations in each chamber and each state, we use a hierarchical model with random intercepts for each of these groups.
We adopt three primary constraints to our sample. Because we make use of majority status, we exclude from our sample chambers without a majority party (the Washington House) and with non-partisan elections (Nebraska).
13 Second, we remove those chambers where sufficient electoral district data is unavailable to accurately calculate party vote differences and district margins in such cases (Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Vermont).
14 Finally, we remove unchallenged seats and leave only those who had vote shares reported in the election (i.e., winning electoral candidates had to face a challenger and win less than 100 percent of the vote). This constraint reduces the sample size by just under two thousand observations but avoids the high frequency of unchallenged candidates/noncompetitive races biasing the sample. This leaves us with a continuous measurement of the district margin based on comparable values.
The resulting data set combines individual and party electoral outcomes with legislator W-NOMINATE spatial predictability statistics in the U.S. States for the 1999-2000 legislative session. This allows us to evaluate behavior in the U.S. states using individual electoral performance, providing us with over four thousand and three hundred legislator observations across eighty-seven U.S. state legislative chambers. Table 1 presents the results from our evaluation. Our primary variables of interest, party vote difference and district margin of victory, are both statistically significant (p≤.01) and in the expected direction (positive and negative, respectively). In addition, we also find that majority party members are systematically more predictable in their behavior than those in the minority party-the majority party effect is positive and statistically significant (p≤.01). Because the sample removes a substantial number of observations, we also evaluate the same model using a sample that includes the observations for legislators elected from unchallenged elections. Despite that these observations cannot be accurately measured and made comparable to the remaining data, including these observations provides some assurance as to the
Findings

13
Coding Nebraska as though it were a "dominant party" case and/or including Washington's House with either party coded as a majority does not substantially effect the results presented below. 14 Districts are missing when candidate party affiliations are not reported and/or vote data was missing. Chambers were removed from the sample if ten percent of districts were missing, this includes: Arkansas (lower chamber, 66 percent missing; upper chamber, 58 percent missing); Florida (lower chamber, 60 percent missing; upper chamber, 65 percent missing); Louisiana (lower chamber, 30 percent missing; upper chamber 32 percent missing); Oklahoma (lower chamber, 42 percent missing; upper chamber, 38 percent missing); and Vermont (lower chamber, 100 percent missing; upper chamber, 100 percent missing).
robustness of the results. These results are also presented in Table 1 and show that each of the findings remain largely unchanged.
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- Table 1 
about here-
To illustrate the results, we produce simulations from our model applying the method described in King, Tomz & Wittenberg (2000) and Tomz, Wittenberg & King (2001) . The simulations are based on the average values for a typical state. Figure 1 graphically shows the predicted effects of varying the weighted log party vote difference and holding the weighted log district margin at its mean for a legislator in the majority and in the minority party. We see that for all legislators there is a strong negative relationship between the one-dimensional voting predictability and the competitiveness of the party system. This is consistent with our main claim that parties should become more coherent in their behavior as the incentives for maintaining a clear partisan reputation become strongest. We also see that, all else equal, legislators in the majority party are also generally more predictable than those in the minority party, indicating a systematic tendency for more coherent behavior for the majority parties. Note that in the distribution of the correct classification rate, the mean is equal to 87 percent and a standard deviation equal to 7 percentage points.
16 A difference of 92 to 86 percent (in the case of majority party legislators) represents a substantial shift within the observed range.
- Figure 1 about hereUsing the same approach from above, we draw simulations to graphically show the predicted effects of varying the weighted log district margin of victory for majority and minority party members in a given state, this time holding party vote difference at its mean. Consistent with the theoretical argument, the simulations show that there is a positive relationship between the legislators' apparent voting constraints and the individual margin of victory for all legislators (see Figure 2) . As with Figure 1 , the range of the y-axis is based on the distribution of the observed range. This result suggests that the least constrained partisans are restricted to those members for whom the party label is least valuable for reelection. We also see again that legislators in the majority party have more predictable behavior on average than those in the minority party. This is consistent with the notion that majority parties have greater access to the types of resources used to systematically constrain the behavior of those members who face the least pressure to vote with coalitions based on district specific considerations.
- Figure 2 about here- 15 We have also performed a number of other robustness checks. We evaluated our model using each of the above samples-the full sample and only challenged candidates-including the states removed due to an insufficient proportion of districts with usable electoral data and find substantively similar results. We have also examined our model using an alternative dependent variable measure, the Geometric Mean Probability (GMP), in place of the classification rate and find substantively similar results across each of the samples. Legislator GMP and the classification rate are correlated at .95. As an alternative to using a measure based on all district elections, we also evaluated these models using only the voting legislator's weighted logged margin of victory over time and also find substantively similar results. For this test, only incumbents have more than one election cycle to derive the measure. Finally, as mentioned above, we find similar results when we use the logged contemporaneous measure for both individual and party competition. 16 see 'ALL' plot in Figure 4 in the Appendix.
Taken together, the results support the argument that parties operating in more competitive electoral environments are more likely to have party members with more predictable behavior. Further, the highest error rates within the party are associated with members elected from the most vulnerable districts-those who would be the costliest to constrain given that they face the greatest competing need to respond to changing electoral constituencies across issues and the least benefit from their party reputation. The results also demonstrate that the majority party has an advantage when it comes to organizing the party to create more predictable behavior. Though both parties may have generally oriented around stable longterm competition patterns, this difference conforms to literature that suggests that majority party should have an immediate advantage in constraining choices of their own members, due to a better ability to influence the legislative process. Cox & McCubbins (1993) have argued that the party reputation can serve as a collective good for a political party, the pursuit of which motivates a delegation of power to its leadership. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the benefits from developing a party record are consistently present. We have argued that the benefits of creating a coherent party record vary not only across legislators, but across parties in different electoral environments. For these benefits to outweigh their costs, the party reputation must be an asset in achieving a collective goal: obtaining or retaining majority status. This rationale for parties to organize is strongest in competitive party systems.
Conclusion
Our findings confirm the reasoning proposed by Clucas (2001, 322) : "if a party's record can also affect members' reelection, then it is possible that as competition increases, members will also become more concerned about their party's output, since the party's output would then have a greater potential to affect their reelection goal." Without this potential, situations parties lack the incentive to delegate to leaders the power to pursue party goals.
When the incentives to organize exist, political parties can utilize a variety of tools in order to manage party reputation, which may be substitutable and complimentary. The judicious use of these tools can balance the expected trade-off between strengthening party reputation and ensuring the (re)election of individual party members. The aggregate effects of these organizational effortsformal and informal, intra and extra-legislativecapture the consequences of legislative party organization. Here we suggest that the incentives to use any of these strategies, alone or in combination, are enhanced by the immediate value of majority status as a party goal.
Using individual level data on the spatial predictability of the voting records of U.S. state legislators, we examined whether structured voting consistent with party organization is in fact explained by the party competition environment. We find that member behavior is indeed more predictable in situations where majority status is likely an immediate collective goal for parties. We interpret this pattern as a consequence of parties whose members have empowered leaders with the authority to strengthen their organizations to achieve this goal. Meanwhile, competition at the district level has the opposite effect, with less predictable voting records associated with individuals in marginal districts. We further find that the majority party has more predictable individual member voting in general. Together, we interpret this empirical pattern as consistent with our generalization of Cox & McCubbins's (1993) intuition-that the "bonding" effects of parties (Jenkins 1999) should be strongest where the expected value of a collective party record is the greatest.
These findings have bearing on the prospect of generalizing theories derived from Congress to other legislatures. While the mechanisms can be broadly applicable, different political contexts provide variation in key assumptions. Here we suggest the salience of group competition for majority status may be an important factor shaping the role that parties play in pursuing the goals of their members. Further, these findings may also provide insight into Congressional parties' emphasis on collective identity as expectations for majority party changes have grown. We have argued that when individual legislators must rely more on cultivating support beyond their partisan, individual voting behavior should tend to be less predictable. Above, we suggest that individual vote margins capture a significant portion of this variation and that we can interpret this measure similarly across states. In the state of New York, however, additional variation can be directly measured to capture the cultivation of votes outside of one's party because of the fusion candidacies that allow for affiliations with more than one party on the electoral ballot in elections.
1D Classification Rate by State and Chamber
Full Sample
1D Classification Rate
Although cross-party appeals may be distinct from catering to constituent groups, obtaining support from separate minor party organizations reflects an effort at cultivating an individual distinction. When candidates cross-list, they can win votes across those parties with whom they affiliate. We can use this information to determine the extent to which a legislator relied on one or more parties to win the election. Here, we presume that a legislator who won with a larger share of her votes from one party is seen as benefiting more from the reputation of that party than a legislator with her vote share distributed across multiple parties. In the latter case, party reputation is not the only factor that determines the outcome of the election.
Limiting our sample to New York allows us to take advantage of intra-state variation between legislators who won votes concentrated in one party and those who won votes across multiple parties. This variation is lost when evaluated across states because of the high frequency of observations clustered at values where legislators won all of their votes from one party. Using the same data as before, our measure comes from the party with whom the legislator won the most votes in the most recent election. The value is the natural log of the percent of total votes won from that largest party. We take the natural log for the same reasons that are explained above. We test the same model as above and include our new measure for the votes won from a candidate's own party. We evaluate two models using Ordinary Least Squares, the first includes Weighted District Margin and the second excludes Weighted District Margin.
The empirical results show that legislators with a larger concentration of vote share in one party are more likely to demonstrate predictable voting behavior than those with vote shares distributed across multiple parties, even when controlling for legislator vote margins. This additional analysis is further evidence in support of the relationship between apparent ideological voting and party dependence. 
Robustness Tests
In this section, we evaluate our empirical model controlling for several additional factors that could contribute to the degree of predictability in legislative voting that have been raised in earlier State legislative research-state legislative professionalism, legislative career structure, state political diversity, and the potential organizing challenges in the chamber owing to the size of its membership.
State Legislative Professionalism. One of the most important factors in explaining patterns of state legislative politics is a chamber's degree of professionalism-that is, a "legislature's capacity to perform its role in the policymaking process with an expertise, seriousness, and effort comparable to other actors in that process" (Mooney 1995, 48) . States are thought to be more professionalized when members have access to the types of resources that are valuable to perform and focus on legislative tasks (e.g., longer legislative calendar, higher salary, and access to legislative staff and office space), which facilitates developing legislative expertise. State legislative professionalism has been used to explain such legislative phenomena as legislative turnover (Moncrief, Niemi & Powell 2004) , legislative-constituent relations (Maestas 2003 , Squire 1993 , government spending (Owings & Borck 2000) , and policy-making complexity and productivity (Ka & Teske 2002 , Squire 1998 . Squire (1992) operationalizes state legislative professionalism as an index from three components-session days, legislative salary, and number of staff-each is measured relative to Congress and captures different concepts of policymaking capacity. This may directly lead to more predictable voting.
17 For our purposes, we simply want to control for state legislative professionalism as an important variable in the literature explaining the operation of legislatures in the literature. We use Squire's (2007) index of state legislative professionalism for this purpose.
Chamber Career Structure. Related to the concept of professionalism, career structures reflect the political goals of members. Clucas (2001) distinguishes between three types of career structures in legislatures-career, springboard, and dead-end. Springboard and deadend legislatures are characterized by high membership turnover, where individual reputation building could be beneficial for achieving future goals outside of the state legislative assembly. Career legislatures have low membership turnover, where members are expected to develop long-term careers. In these legislatures, party members have a greater incentive to delegate authority to party leaders to coordinate members in order to satisfy the collective needs of the party (Battista & Richman 2011 ). Compared to short-term legislatures, legislators in career legislatures should have more coherent behavior than those in either springboard or dead-end legislatures. We follow Battista & Richman (2011) in dichotomizing this measure to indicate if a state has a "career" legislature. 17 We find some justification for this claim in Mooney (1995) , who finds cross-sectional empirical evidence that states with heterogeneous populations tend to have more professionalized legislatures. Mooney (1995, 49) argues that the value for professionalized legislatures is higher in states with heterogeneous populations because "differences [among the varied sub-populations] in tastes, values, and problem-solving styles may cause more intractable and frequent public problems" that demand a greater "efficient and authoritative public decision-making legislative body." Since the same reasoning may apply directly to predictability, we address below the possibility that more heterogeneous populations would lead to more authority to party leaders in order to strengthen a party reputation.
State Diversity. Previous research suggests that the heterogeneity of states' populations may lead to a more complex policymaking environment (Battista & Richman 2011 , King 2000 , Mooney 1995 . On one hand, the complexities of the legislative environment might increase with greater variety in the social groups represented. On the other hand, political diversity among citizens may lead to demand for a better organized party system (Battista & Richman 2011 ). This may be partly captured above to the extent that professionalization is endogenous to social diversity (Mooney 1995) . For our purposes, we wish to simply control for any separate effect that political diversity might have on predictability of behavior. In order to capture this concept for all states in our sample we use presidential election data as a means of capturing variance in at least the political preferences among the public. States with a more homogeneous (heterogeneous) ideology may have a more (less) similar presidential voting patterns across the state. Less consistent voting patterns across the state suggest the existence of greater diversity. For this purpose, we use the 2000 presidential election data from Lublin & Voss (2001) to capture the extent of political diversity across the state, based on the standard deviation of Democratic presidential vote within in each state.
18 This measure provides an approximation of the concept of state diversity using data that is available across the entire sample of states.
Chamber size. We argue above that organizational incentives and abilities are key factors in predictable voting. Larger legislatures experience greater baseline challenges to overcoming the collective action problem (Battista & Richman 2011 , Richman 2010 , Wright & Winburn 2003 . Battista & Richman (2011) and Richman (2010) suggest that legislative behavior is more difficult to organize in general in chambers with more legislators because greater difficulty in solving collective action problems. This concept may capture some of the baseline variation in the degree of predictability we should expect. From this reasoning, we would expect there to always be less predictable voting in larger chambers, where the natural barriers to organizing may be the greatest. We use the total number of legislators as a proxy for this concept.
Because some of these variables are related to one another, we evaluate each variable separately added to our main model above before jointly evaluating one model with all of these variables. We do this using both the constrained and the full sample from the table above.
Among these variables, we see that state legislative professionalism and the total number of legislators have consistent relationship with predictability in line with expectations. This suggests that legislative professionalism and the organizational challenges posed by large chambers may play a role in establishing the baseline predictability of legislative voting. Career legislatures also appear to have some effect in increasing predictability, though only in the full sample and only when the professionalism measure is not included in the model. In each of the models we find results for our main variables similar to those presented above. Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% * * : 1% Standard Errors in parentheses.
